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Abstract
Traditional legal approaches assume that a court is legitimate when its 
decisions are faithful to the text that expresses the mandate for which it was 
created (the Constitution, in the case of  domestic courts; and the treaty, in 
the case of  international courts).  However, studies employing game theory, 
especially the Hawk-Dove game, show that judges of  international courts 
cannot always be faithful to this mandate and provide the single right legal 
answer to the cases brought before them for it would risk the stability of  
the whole system. In light of  these findings, the objective of  this paper is 
to sketch the foundations of  a new theory of  legitimacy that justifies the 
authority of  international adjudicative bodies and provides a framework to 
assess their activity.  The paper hypothesizes that the role of  international 
courts is not (and cannot be) solely to provide the unique right legal answer 
on a case-to-case basis in an approach that focuses on individual rights. Ins-
tead, their role is to advance and sustain a “legitimate state of  affairs” that is 
in line with the normative goals that motivated the creation of  the interna-
tional organization. Employing an analytical methodological approach, the 
authors take as a starting point game theory models and findings by Dyevre 
and Loth, and use the theory of  the “objective dimension of  fundamental 
rights” advanced by Robert Alexy and the theory of  the “unconstitutional 
state of  affairs” advanced by the Colombian Constitutional Court in order 
to rebuild a coherent theory of  the legitimacy of  international adjudicative 
bodies.
Keywords: Hawk-Dove game. Legitimacy. International courts.
Resumo
Abordagens jurídicas tradicionais presumem que uma corte é legítima 
quando suas decisões são fiéis ao texto que expressa o mandato para o qual 
foram criadas (a Constituição, no caso de cortes domésticas; e o tratado, 
no caso de cortes internacionais). No entanto, estudos empregando teoria 
dos jogos, especialmente o jogo do Gavião-Pombo, mostram que os juízes 
de cortes internacionais não podem ser sempre fiéis a esse mandato e dar 
a única resposta jurídica certa para os casos que lhe são trazidos, pois isso 
arriscaria a estabilidade de todo o sistema. À luz desses achados, o objetivo 
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deste artigo é traçar as fundações de uma nova teoria de 
legitimidade que justifique a autoridade de órgãos adju-
dicatórios internacionais e ofereça um parâmetro para 
avaliar sua atividade. A hipótese é de que o papel das 
cortes internacionais não é (e não pode ser) apenas dar 
a resposta jurídica certa com base no caso a caso e com 
uma abordagem que foque em direitos individuais. Ao 
contrário, seu papel é avançar e sustentar um “estado de 
coisas legítimo” alinhado com os objetivos normativos 
que motivaram a criação da organização internacional. 
Empregando uma metodologia analítica, os autores 
tomam como ponto de partida modelos da teoria dos 
jogos e os achados de Dyevre e Loth, e usam a teoria 
da “dimensão objetiva dos direitos fundamentais” ela-
borada por Robert Alexy e a teoria do “estado de coisas 
inconstitucional” da Corte Constitucional Colombiana 
para reconstruir uma teoria da legitimidade dos órgãos 
adjudicatórios internacionais.
Palavras-chaves : Jogo Gavião-Pombo. Legitimidade. 
Cortes intercionais.  
1 Introduction 
Lawyers usually think of  judgments in strictly le-
gal terms, that is, the applicable legislation, the correct 
invocation of  case law, the appropriateness of  this or 
that principle. For them, this is how adjudication is and 
should be done since the law is an autopoietic system1, 
whereby all economic, political and other external in-
fluences are filtered out when they enter the legal realm. 
Rarely, lawyers, especially judges, explicitly admit that 
outside factors played a crucial role in an adjudication 
outcome. Even more rarely, they will explicitly posit 
that these aspects should play any role. The professional 
ethos – and the belief  in the explanatory power of  the 
law that comes with it – hinders lawyers from incorpo-
rating into legal theory the many power relationships 
outside the law involved in a judgment. Therefore, when 
they actually have an influence more significant than the 
strictly legal reason, it is seen as a failure to achieve the 
right answer2, a disruption in the system, but not as so-
mething inherent to and compatible with the law.
1 LUHMANN, N. Law as a Social System. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2004.
2 DWORKIN, R. No Right Answer. New York University Law Re-
view, v. 53, n. 1, p. 1-32, 1978.
This tendency to try to explain adjudication exclu-
sively in legal terms has been decreasing though. Many 
studies show that things such as gender, age, politi-
cal preference, tiredness affect judgments3. For legal 
theory, yet, these are human flaws that must be overco-
me, but that do not affect the very foundations of  the 
law, understood as a system with an internal coherence 
that can be protected from these biases. Amongst these 
recent studies, however, there is one field that challen-
ges traditional jurisprudence, namely, that of  judicial 
dialogues between heterarchical courts. The lack of  
hierarchical superiority of  international courts poses a 
difficulty to legal theory because there is no supremacy 
of  the constitution to explain their legitimacy, and con-
sequently neither why national courts should comply 
with their decisions nor why they do so when there is 
no punishment at stake.
Departing from purely doctrinal approaches, a range 
of  recent studies has tried to grasp the peculiar rela-
tionship between courts in non-hierarchical internatio-
nal settings. Relying on empirical data, studies show that 
not only seeking the right answer motivates the dialo-
gue between national and international courts, but also 
exogenous factors, such as the country’s involvement 
in transnational economic activity4. Moreover, empiri-
cal findings show that resistance towards the interna-
tional court’s decision has varied reasons: some relate 
to legal issues, such as the preservation of  national 
identity, others are simply policy or personal preferen-
ces of  the judges5. The support of  the legislative and 
executive also seems to influence adjudication, pushing 
judges into strategical behavior when they face political 
constraints, i.e., threats of  non-compliance or legislative 
override6. Politics indeed appears to be a major power 
influencing the behavior of  international courts. In this 
3 For example, BOYD, C.; EPSTEIN, L.; MARTIN, A. Untan-
gling the Causal Effects of  Sex on Judging. American Journal of  Politi-
cal Science, v. 54, n. 2, p. 389–411, Apr. 2010; HANGARTNER, D.; 
LAUDERDALE, B. E.; SPIRIG, J. Refugee Roulette Revisited: Judicial 
Preference Variation and Aggregation on the Swiss Federal Admin-
istrative Court 2007-2012. Available at: http://benjaminlauderdale.
net/files/papers/SwissAsylumPanels.pdf
4 CARRUBBA, C. J.; MURRAH, L. Legal Integration and Use of  
the Preliminary Ruling Process in the European Union. International 
Organization, v. 59, p. 399-418, 2005.
5 HOFMANN, A. Resistance against the Court of  Justice of  the Euro-
pean Union. Copenhagen, iCourts - The Danish National Research 
Foundation’s Centre of  Excellence for International Courts, 2018.
6 CARRUBBA, C. J.; GABEL, M.; HANKLA, C. Judicial Behavior 
under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of  
Justice. American Political Schience Review, v. 102, n. 4, p. 435-452, 2008.
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regard, Helfer and Alter7, by comparing cases before the 
Court of  Justice of  the European Union, the Andean 
Tribunal of  Justice, and the Economic Community of  
West African States Court of  Justice, found that the le-
gitimacy of  international courts before national govern-
ments is not affected by their activism or constraint, but 
by political and contextual traits of  the system.
Similarly, game theory has displayed interesting in-
sights. Trying to understand why domestic systems 
comply or not with international decisions, Carrubba 
and Gabel8 modeled a game of  the interaction between 
international courts and national governments. They 
found that governments comply with decisions when 
they anticipate being sanctioned by peers (other gover-
nments) or when the decision is not too harsh; moreo-
ver, courts are more likely to rule against states when 
they have government’s support. Focusing on dialogues 
between courts (i.e., excluding the government), Loth9 
and Dyevre10 argue that courts’ advances and setbacks 
can be understood as a Hawk-Dove game. According to 
them, when tensions escalate, one player/court refrains 
from being assertive in order to avoid an insurmounta-
ble conflict, consequently keeping the dialogue going 
on. Despite both authors use of  the Hawk-Dove game 
as an explanatory tool, Dyevre takes a more descripti-
ve emphasis, whereas Loth reflects on the implications 
of  recognizing the existence of  the game, specifically 
regarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of  the Eu-
ropean system. Overall, what these studies show is that 
courts act strategically, considering other factors than 
just the law. This is not a novel claim though. For ins-
tance, Kelemen11 listed a number of  works that suggest 
7 HELFER, L. R.; ALTER, K. J. Legitimacy and Lawmaking: A 
Tale of  Three International Courts. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, v. 14, 
p. 479-503, 2013.
8 CARRUBBA, C. J.; GABEL, M. J. Courts, Compliance, and the 
Quest for Legitimacy in International Law. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 
v. 14, p. 505-543, 2013.
9 LOTH, M. Who has the last word: On judicial lawmaking in Eu-
ropean private law. European Review of  Private Law, p. 45-70, 2017.
10 DYEVRE, A. Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of  
international legal regimes. European Journal of  Law and Econom-
ics, v. 44, p. 453–481, 2017. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10657-016-9551-2; DYEVRE, A. The Future of  Legal Theory and the 
Law School of  the Future. Intersentia: Antwerp, 2016. ISBN 978-1-
78068-374-4; DYEVRE, A. Judicial Non-Compliance in a Non-Hier-
archical Legal Order: Isolated Accident or Omen of  Judicial Arma-
geddon?  2012. Unpublished paper. From the SelectedWorks of  
Arthur Dyevre. Available at: htt ps://works.bepress.com/arthur_
dyevre1/7/.
11 KELEMEN, D.The Limits of  Judicial Power: Trade-Environ-
ment Disputes in the GATT/WTO and the EU. Comparative Political 
that courts adjust their precedents as a reaction to po-
litical pressures. Likewise, Bailliet12 suggests that the 
Inter-American Court of  Human Rights refrains from 
issuing advisory opinions in controversial cases to pre-
vent countries from withdrawing from the Inter-Ameri-
can system, which as a strategic move.
Notwithstanding Loth’s contribution, the norma-
tive implications of  these studies – especially his and 
Dyevre’s – remain undertheorized insofar there are no 
exhaustive discussions in this regard. As we do not want 
to dismiss these findings by labeling them as mere ex-
ceptions or abstractions, we are left with a puzzle since 
legal theory seems to be incompatible with them. On 
the one hand, legal theory tells us that there is a single 
right answer to each case, that ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus 
(where there is the same reason, there is the same law), 
and that ubi eadem legis ratio ibi eadem dispositio (where there 
is the same reason, there is same reason to decide). On 
the other hand, empirical and game-theoretical works 
show us that, in practice, cases alike are being decided 
differently, depending on circumstances that have no-
thing to do with the cases themselves. Framed like this, 
legal theory and the empiric findings seem irreconcila-
ble because, unlike theory, the practice of  international 
courts is akin to a political game in which serving the 
law is not necessarily the leading rule.  
In face of  these challenges to legal scholarship, and 
aiming at not having a theory that is completely deta-
ched from reality, we propose incorporating Loth’s and 
Dyevre’s game-theoretical models into normative legal 
theory. To this end, we will answer the ensuing question: 
in international non-hierarchical judicial dialogues, how could it 
be legitimate for international courts to privilege the maintenance 
of  the system over purely legal arguments related solely to the case? 
In order to answer this question, we will focus on the 
concept of  legitimacy, following a discussion that was 
initiated by Loth13 (although with significant conceptual 
differences). Furthermore, we will rely on a range of  
theoretical models that have been elaborated to tackle 
the issues that arise from problematic decision settings, 
namely theories of  legal and moral justifiability, cons-
Studies, v. 34, n. 6, p. 623, 2001.
12 BAILLIET, C. M. The strategic prudence of  The Inter-Amer-
ican Court of  Human Rights: rejection of  requests for an advisory 
opinion. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 15, n. 1, p. 254-276, 
2018.
13 LOTH, M. Who has the last word: On judicial lawmaking in 
European private law. European Review of  Private Law, p. 45-70, 2017.
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titutional state of  affairs, institutional and substantive 
principles. 
The intended contribution of  this paper is to pro-
vide a solid normative justification for these strategic 
behaviors. For a normative justification to be possi-
ble, we must rely on some assumptions since legitima-
cy does not work in all scenarios (for instance, when 
judges act strategically to keep their salaries). As said 
before, our goal is to bring the strategic behavior that 
courts engage in, like in a Hawk-Dove game, to the legal 
realm, so that the strategy would be lawful. To do so, we 
assume that judges are in fact constrained by the law, 
i.e., the law effectively limits their possible answers to 
cases, despite external circumstances. This means either 
adhering to the single right answer or admitting varied 
right answers, but that judges will not choose legally 
inadmissible answers. Another assumption is that the 
legitimacy of  international courts is more endangered 
than that of  domestic courts if  one acknowledges that 
judges behave strategically. Given that, generally, they 
do not have coercive enforcement mechanisms, they 
need to appear more legitimate, which means, in practi-
ce, relying on other mechanisms (not legal in nature) to 
increase the costs of  not complying with their decisions 
and enhance their practical power. These mechanisms 
turn them from a court of  law that (in principle) acts as 
an unconditional counterweight to political power to se-
cure the rights of  the people to an institution that must 
work strategically to try to accomplish its mandate.
Employing an analytical methodological approach, 
we take as a starting point game theory models and fin-
dings by Dyevre and Loth, and use the theory of  the 
“objective dimension of  fundamental rights” advanced 
by Robert Alexy and the theory of  the “unconstitutio-
nal state of  affairs” advanced by the Colombian Consti-
tutional Court in order to rebuild a coherent theory of  
the legitimacy of  international adjudicative bodies.  Ac-
cording to Alexy, rights should not only be considered 
in their individual dimension but also in their objective 
dimension, which means that they are guiding principles 
that infuse the whole legal activity.  This conception of  
rights as principles entails that they should be advanced 
to the largest extent possible14.  In turn, the extent to which 
a principle should be developed depends on the cons-
traints faced by the legislators and adjudicators.  As we 
14 ALEXY, R. On the Structure of  Legal Principles. Ratio Juris, v. 
13, n. 3, 2000.
will argue in this paper, adjudicators face strong poli-
tical constraints, which ought to be considered in order 
to avoid what the Colombian Constitutional Court cal-
led an “unconstitutional state of  affairs”15, such as the 
collapse of  the international adjudicative body.
To answer the proposed research question, this pa-
per is divided as follows. Following this introduction, we 
will flash the serious implications that game theory po-
ses to legal theory by fostering a dialogue between Loth 
and Dyevre with positivist and post-positivist decision 
theory (section 2). Afterward, we will present theories 
on the legitimacy of  courts, and how they render pa-
tent the issue of  courts’ strategic behavior (section 3). 
Subsequently, we will proceed to try to reconcile game 
theory and normative legal theory, focusing on courts’ 
legitimacy (section 4). Finally, some concluding remarks 
will summarize the main points made throughout the 
paper (section 5). 
2 Game theory vs. legal theory 
Thinking of  courts in terms of  game theory gives 
a different outlook from the perspective provided by 
legal theory, which focuses on how they should work. 
This difference and the problems it entails might not be 
self-evident though. To explain the repercussions of  the 
game theory to jurisprudence, we will elaborate on what 
the Hawk-Dove game teaches us about judicial dialogue 
in international non-hierarchical settings. Then, we will 
expose its implications to traditional legal theory.
According to Loth16 and Dyevre1718, the Hawk-Dove 
game is a useful tool to understand how international 
and national courts interact. Dyevre models a game that 
considers the political bargaining capital of  the national 
and international courts before one another and before 
the general political setting (for an international court, 
this means the support of  member countries for being 
15 QUINTERO, J.; NAVARRO, A.; MESA, M. El Estado de Cosas 
Inconstitucionales como mecanismo de protección de los derechos 
fundamentales de la población vulnerable de Colombia. Revista Ju-
rídica Mario Alario D’Filippo, v. 3, n. 1, p. 69–80, 2011. 
16 LOTH, M. Who has the last word: On judicial lawmaking in 
European private law. European Review of  Private Law, p. 45-70, 2017.
17 DYEVRE, A. Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of  
international legal regimes, European Journal of  Law and Economics, v. 
44, p. 453–481, 2017.
18 Given that their works were the inspiration for this paper, we 
will focus only on their writings.
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assertive; for national courts, this means the support of  
their legislatures and executives to their non-complian-
ce with the international decision). His model also con-
siders the repetition of  the dialogue, which eventually 
steers the dialogue in the direction of  cooperation, 
neutralizing the advantage of  being the first mover. In 
summary, his Hawk-Dove game asserts that depending 
on whether one or another is assertive (or both or nei-
ther), the final result (i.e., the decision issued and the 
compliance with it) is different. 
Likewise, Loth uses the Hawk-Dove game to explain 
why, within the European system, courts claim to have 
the final word on conflictual matters. This way, a court 
poses like a hawk in order to force the other to be the 
dove. Most of  the times, Loth argues, the courts do not 
actually act like hawks, for that would be costly. On the 
contrary, they both act like doves, refraining from impo-
sing itself  over the other, thus, sharing the jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, this dynamic is a sort of  strategic behavior 
on the part of  the courts, which could be contended as 
detrimental. For Loth, however, the strategy is justified 
because it promotes the courts’ legitimacy. The legiti-
macy, or “good reasons”19, for strategically engaging in 
dialogue rather than installing one court with authority 
over the other is twofold. First, the continuous dialogue 
promotes institutional balance since courts function as 
checks and balances of  one another. Second, it might 
foster substantive equilibrium because both the national 
and international interests are realized to some extent. 
For these institutional and substantive equilibria to be 
effective, Loth reasons, domestic courts must provide a 
counterweight to the European court through detailed 
information and good reasoning. 
Although undeniably useful for understanding 
courts’ interactions, this Hawk-Dove explanation has 
a challenging implication to legal theory. Legal theory 
is concerned with issuing decisions in accordance with 
statutes, case-law, established doctrines, and the facts of  
the case. Game theory, on the other hand, seems not to 
worry about the actual case at hand, but mostly with the 
courts in and of  themselves and the costs they face20. In 
19 LOTH, M. Who has the last word: On judicial lawmaking in 
European private law. European Review of  Private Law, p. 55, 2017.
20 “Fig 1 Jurisdictional dispute as one-shot game. J denotes the 
value of  the jurisdictional resource at stake for the domestic court 
and a the value attached by the international court to the same 
jurisdictional resource. C and b represent the cost arising from a 
constitutional crisis for, respectively, the domestic court and the in-
ternational court”. DYEVRE, A. Domestic judicial defiance and the 
this regard, the absence of  a variable for the case in the 
models is telling. Given that decisions involve the courts 
and the case that started the dialogue in the first place, 
we are left with the following question: is the outcome 
that resulted from the strategic conduct compatible with 
the legal answer that considers only the facts of  the case 
in face of  the legal order? To better illustrate the ques-
tion, let us problematize one of  Dyevre’s assertions. In 
a passage, he states that “weak [international] regimes 
[…], anticipating non-compliance [from the national 
courts], restrictively interpret the provisions enshrined 
in the international agreement”21. This statement bears 
an implicit repercussion. Namely, were the internatio-
nal regime strong, the international agreement would 
have been interpreted extensively, and consequently, the 
decision for that same case would have been different, 
even though the difference is in the court itself, not in 
the case. In this hypothetical, abstract example, which 
decision would be right, that of  the strong regime or of  
the weak one? Is it possible that both are right? Does it 
matter? And for whom? 
At some level, we are reviving an old positivist and 
post-positivist discussion, here represented only by two 
emblematic authors, Hart and Dworkin. According to 
Hart22, the law does not and cannot provide adjudica-
tors with a single right answer. Instead, in hard cases, 
in which legal language is ambiguous or vague, judges 
have discretion in choosing among the possible solu-
tions that law indicates which one they think is the most 
appropriate. For Hart, then, both decisions referred to 
in the paragraph above could be valid, as long as they 
were within the judges’ discretion. Dworkin would be 
dissatisfied with such a solution. For him, cases have 
a unique right answer23. Despite changes in this theory 
over time24, Dworkin maintained that law, viewed as in-
tegrity, provides one right answer. For him, neither the 
authority of  international legal regimes, European Journal of  Law and 
Economics, v. 44, 2017, p. 460.
21 DYEVRE, A. Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of  
international legal regimes, European Journal of  Law and Economics, v. 
44, p. 462, 2017.
22 HART, H. L. A. The Concept of  Law. 2nd Edition ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994.
23 DWORKIN, R. No Right Answer. New York University Law Re-
view, v. 53, n. 1, p. 1-32, 1978. DWORKIN, R. How Law is Like Lit-
erature. In: LAW’S Empire. Cambridge, London: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1986. p. 146-166. DWORKIN, R. Taking Rights Seriously. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.
24 BIX, B. Ronald Dworkin’s Right Answer Thesis. In: LAW, Lan-
guage, and Legal Determinacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993. p. 77-132.
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ambiguity, open-texture, or vagueness of  language hin-
ders its existence, nor does the fact that two reasonable 
people might find two equally reasonable, though diver-
gent, answers25. Conscientiously, patiently, and pruden-
tly, judges could find what the right answer, all things 
considered, would be. This answer would maintain the 
coherence and integrity of  the law as if  each decision 
were part of  a chain novel26. 
When combined with the Hawk-Dove game, both 
legal theories present grave complications though. An 
example will help to illustrate the matter. Suppose that 
an international court receives a new case about the use 
of  religious symbols in public spaces. The national court 
forbade the use of  a symbol in its sentence A. In this 
particular situation, the international court has two op-
tions27: i) override A, and replace it with B, in which the 
person can use the symbol, because religious freedom is 
assured in the international commitments of  this coun-
try; ii) sustain A because it is a domestic issue, which is 
also secured by the treaty. Outside the case, the situation 
is problematic. In the past interactions between these 
international and domestic courts, the former has been 
prevailing. Because of  this, the domestic court has been 
signaling its dissatisfaction for having to disregard its 
own solutions, and the national executive and legislative 
have been threatening to leave the system for what they 
see as an unduly invasion in the country’s sovereignty. 
The international court knows that, given the context, 
the threat is real. The domestic court is amongst the 
powerful ones (though not the most powerful). Evalua-
ting these elements, the international court chooses to 
uphold the domestic court’s decision. Translating this 
situation to that Hawk-Dove model, it means that the 
international court acted as a dove, whereas the domes-
tic court got to be the hawk. Now, let us combine it 
with positivism28 and post-positivism to elaborate on 
25 DWORKIN, R. No Right Answer. New York University Law Re-
view, v. 53, n. 1, p. 1-32, 1978. DWORKIN, R. How Law is Like Lit-
erature. In: LAW’S Empire. Cambridge, London: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1986. p. 146-166. DWORKIN, R. Taking Rights Seriously. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.
26 DWORKIN, R. How Law is Like Literature. In: LAW’S Empire. 
Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1986. p. 146-166.
27 We are dealing with only two options to facilitate the point we 
want to make. It is not to confuse the international court with a 
court of  cassation nor to say that there are always only two options.
28 For another type of  analysis that takes into consideration strate-
gic courts’ behavior and judges’ discretion see DOTHAN, S. How 
International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy. Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law, v. 14, p. 455-478, 2013, who considered how courts can use 
legal reasoning to mask discretion and their policy preferences.
the normative implications.   
According to Hartian positivism, there are easy 
cases, whereby the literal wording of  the law applies 
clearly to solve the dispute, and there are hard cases, in 
which law provides more than one possible solution, 
which is the situation above. In that hard case, the law 
points to two equally possible solutions, A or B. Given 
they are both valid decisions (and reasonable interpre-
tations), judges have the discretion to choose the one 
they believe to be the most appropriate. Choosing ei-
ther A or B is, then, equivalent, for both are be valid 
solutions within the discretionary power of  the judge 
to make the law29. Adding now what we have learned 
from game theory, we can conclude that the relevant 
factor for the decision, in the end, is then the courts’ 
dynamic. If  judges can decide either way, then, the true 
weighty element to be considered is the judicial dialogue 
(considering power and convenience). Under Hartian 
positivism, the law can equally justify both decisions. 
However, the political consequences are not equal, so 
one strategy will be better than others (law just follows 
the decision). Accepting that judges do act strategically, 
the implication of  game theory within Hartian positi-
vism in the context of  international judicial dialogues is 
that decisions are more political than legal. The reasons 
that would make judges pick answer A over B30 are not 
necessarily connected to their supposed willingness to 
make the best legal choice (though legally correct), but 
would be politically motivated (in that case, keep the 
dialogue going on). If  it is so, adjudicator organs only 
differ from purely political institutions in terms of  vo-
cabulary. 
Post-positivism, its turn, also poses an embarras-
sment when combined with game theory. In the case 
above, only A or B can be the right answer, not both, 
not neither. Supposing that, considering the facts of  the 
case and the legal order, B is the right answer. So, if  
there is indeed a single right answer that is attainable to 
judges, and if  they are rational agents (as game theory 
presupposes), it follows that, sometimes, they deliberate-
ly choose to sacrifice the right answer to the individual 
case for the sake of  the continuity of  the judicial dia-
29 HART, H. L. A. The Concept of  Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994. p. 273.
30 Of  course, there is always the possibility that the political con-
straints take judges to select a legally inadmissible answer C, but that 
is not an immediate implication of  game-theory to positivism, and 
that is also a problem present in Dworkin’s post-positivism.
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logue, which is a utilitarian type of  reasoning. This is at 
odds with Dworkinian theory. As Mackie31 summarizes 
Dworkin’s position: “if  they [judges] let policy outwei-
gh principle, they will be sacrificing someone’s rights in 
order to benefit or satisfy others, and this is unjust”. 
Therefore, if  solution B was the right answer to the 
case above, a game theory scheme that displays the right 
answer would show that there is only one outcome in 
which it is actually applied, as our table below illustrates:
Table – Hawk-Dove Game and the Right Legal Answer
International Court 
Assertive
International Court 
Restraint 
National Court 
Restraint
Right answer 
prevails
Right answer (s) 
disregarded
National Court 
Assertive
Right answer 
prevails in the 
decision, but is 
disregarded in 
practice 
Right answer 
disregarded
So far, we have shown the consequences of  game 
theory to decision-making based on our assumption 
that judges are, in fact, constrained by the law. Howe-
ver, it is to notice that, since in game theory there is no 
variable for the case, even completely wrong answers 
are admissible because the case does not count for 
anything, putting it closer to the Scandinavian form of  
realism. Therefore, the disregard for the right answer 
and the political weight are rendered more patent. 
In these three situations (positivism, post-positi-
vism, and game theory), the question whether the inter-
national court acted legitimately arises since its primary 
function is to apply the law (political considerations are 
supposed to be dealt with by political organs). Howe-
ver, this question remains unanswered. Dyevre32 was 
not concerned with the legitimacy of  the courts; the-
refore, he did not elaborate on anything in this regard 
in the paper mentioned above. However, in The future 
of  legal theory and the law school of  the future33, he indica-
tes not adhering to the unique right answer thesis. For 
him, when Dworkin denies that judges have discretion, 
but find the right answer, he was actually conducting 
31 MACKIE, J. The Third Theory of  Law. Philosophy and Public Af-
fairs, v. 7, n. 1, p. 5, 1977.
32 DYEVRE, A. Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of  
international legal regimes, European Journal of  Law and Economics, v. 
44, p. 453–481, 2017. 
33 DYEVRE, A. The Future of  Legal Theory and the Law School of  the 
Future. Intersentia: Antwerp, 2016.
“a masterful exercise in defence of  the US Supreme 
Court’s civil rights revolution”34. According to Dyevre35, 
Dworkin’s influence as a scholar is attributable, in lar-
ge part, to his rhetorical abilities in framing his ideas 
sympathetically rather than in establishing a coherent 
and practical jurisprudence. Therefore, Dyevre seems 
to reject the possibility of  existing a unique right answer 
for all the cases, but he does not explicitly endorse po-
sitivism either. Although, as stated above, Loth asserts 
that the legitimacy of  the Hawk-Dove interaction is to 
provide a means for checks and balances and to foster a 
balanced development of  law, this understanding of  le-
gitimacy is not extensively developed in his paper since 
it was beyond its scope. Moreover, it does not address 
the lawfulness of  solving cases primarily considering 
the system in the long run, instead of  the case alone. 
These implications (equating an adjudicator organ 
to a political one and disregarding the right answer) are 
seemingly serious threats that game theory presents to 
the legitimacy of  courts. As adjudicatory bodies that are 
(and should be) mostly concerned with the law, their 
legitimacy cannot depend only on the power they wield 
(or the effectiveness of  their decisions, to employ a ju-
ristic terminology), but on how they manage to apply 
the law correctly. Legitimacy is, thus, at the core of  the 
reconciliation between game and legal theory.
3 Legitimacy 
So, when is an institution (legislature, court, adminis-
trative agency) legitimate? Unfortunately, legitimacy is an 
evasive concept.  Since it is not used to refer to some-
thing that has a physical existence in reality, there is vast 
disagreement over the features it encompasses. In gene-
ral, legitimacy is the abstract concept that supports (theo-
retically and practically) the existence of  the law. Other 
than that common trait, there are disagreements between 
scholars. Given these differences, and for conceptual cla-
rity, we will briefly summarize the main positions. 
To this end, we will rely on the distinction drawn by 
Falllon36, according to which legitimacy is understood in 
34 DYEVRE, A. The Future of  Legal Theory and the Law School of  the 
Future. Intersentia: Antwerp, 2016. p. 38.
35 DYEVRE, A. The Future of  Legal Theory and the Law School of  the 
Future. Intersentia: Antwerp, 2016. p. 38.
36 FALLON, R. Legitimacy and the Constitution. Harvard Law Re-
view, v. 118, p. 1787, 2005.
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three meanings: a) legal, b) moral, and c) sociological. This 
distinction is analogous to the well-established analytical 
framework advanced by Bobbio, who distinguished three 
different criteria to analyze the legal norms, namely, va-
lidity, justice, and efficacy, respectively37.  Indeed, accor-
ding to Bobbio, a norm is valid if  it exists as a legal rule, 
it is just if  it goes in accordance with the higher moral 
values (that ought to inspire law) and it is efficacious if  
it is accepted and followed by the people to which it is 
addressed (or enforced by the authorities otherwise)38. 
Relying on this distinction, we contend, based on Fallon, 
that legitimacy (as does any legal command) also has 
three different dimensions: a legal, a moral and a social 
(factual) one.  In short, an international adjudicative body 
is legitimate in the legal sense if  it (generally) follows the 
applicable law; it is legitimate in the moral sense if  their 
decisions are (generally) fair; and it is legitimate in the 
sociological sense if  it is supported (in practice) by its 
constituencies (the people and the political authorities)39.
These three dimensions are independent of  one 
another. It is possible for a norm to be issued in accor-
dance with the legal parameters for its validity, but can 
be unjust and efficacious at the same time.  In the same 
manner, it can be invalid but just and efficacious; or in-
valid, unjust but efficacious nevertheless; and so on40.  A 
similar relation can be observed with the three different 
dimensions of  legitimacy.  The overall activity of  an 
adjudicative body can generally be legitimate in the le-
gal sense; however, it might be perceived as illegitimate 
(sociologically) by its constituencies; or vice versa, can 
be perceived as legitimate (sociologically), even when it 
generally acts in violation of  its founding law. 
Ideally, however, the three dimensions vary in accor-
dance with one another.  That is to say: if  an interna-
tional adjudicative body (generally) acts in violation of  
the law, then it must be the case that their decisions are 
also unjust, and its sociological legitimacy must be ex-
tremely weak to the point of  its imminent collapse.  On 
the other hand, if  its decisions (generally) follow the 
binding law, then they must be just, and its sociological 
legitimacy should be extremely strong.
37 BOBBIO, N. Teoría General del Derecho. 5th ed. Bogotá: Temis, 
2016. 
38 BOBBIO, N. Teoría General del Derecho. 5th ed. Bogotá: Temis, 
2016. 
39 FALLON, R. Legitimacy and the Constitution. Harvard Law Re-
view, v. 118, 2005.
40 BOBBIO, N. Teoría General del Derecho. 5th ed. Bogotá: Temis, 
2016. 
That threefold classification (legal, moral, and so-
ciological) does not encompass all the possible approa-
ches to legitimacy. For instance, Carrubba and Gabel41 
researched whether national compliance depends on 
the legitimacy of  the international court. They do not, 
however, provide a definition of  legitimacy, leaving it 
implicit that it is more of  a sentiment that people and 
states have towards a court that mixes its legal mandate, 
its principled action, and the public support. Either way, 
for the sake of  clarity, we will present those three ap-
proaches below. Afterward, we will explain the difficulty 
in assigning only one of  these concepts of  legitimacy to 
international courts.  
3.1 The (purely) legal approach 
From the legal sense, legitimacy refers to an abstract 
idea that connects the decisions of  a court with its ori-
ginal mission that was established in its constitutive act. 
This could be either a Constitution of  a specific coun-
try or an international treaty to which some States have 
agreed. This act has charged adjudicatory bodies with 
a primary obligation, which is, essentially, the enforce-
ment of  a set of  rules, principles, and values that we 
know, simply, as law. The fulfillment of  this obligation 
justifies the courts’ authority.  It follows that a decision 
from a court is legitimate when it is faithful to the ter-
ms of  its mandate expressed in its constitutive act. In 
Hartian terms, judges enjoy legal legitimacy as long as 
they abide by whichever norm that is produced by a 
hierarchical normative system whose origin is a rule of  
recognition42. Therefore, the fact that a law has been 
issued, a Constitution enacted or an international treaty 
ratified, justifies in and of  itself  the activity of  a court.
There is an essential formalist trait underpinning this 
definition of  legitimacy. The fact that a law has been is-
sued, a Constitution enacted or an international treaty 
ratified, validates in and of  itself  the activity of  a court. 
As long as the court acts within the confines of  the po-
sitive law, which is the reason a court exists in the first 
place, then, it is legitimate. Legitimacy becomes, thus, 
the mere obedience to the law supported only by the 
fact that a law has been enacted. Put bluntly, the con-
41 CARRUBBA, C. J.; GABEL, M. J. Courts, Compliance, and the 
Quest for Legitimacy in International Law. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 
v. 14, p. 505-543, 2013.
42 HART, H. L. A. El concepto de derecho. (G. Carrrió, Ed.). Buenos 
Aires: Abeledo- Perrot, 1963.
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tent of  the law is irrelevant. Because substance matters, 
purely legal legitimacy has been deemed insufficient by 
other strands. 
3.2 The moral (normative) approach 
Incorporating part of  the legal approach, the nor-
mative adds another element to the compliance with 
enacted norms, namely, a moral justification. Under this 
strand, the idea of  legitimacy as being solely connected 
to the obedience of  law cannot be considered complete. 
Human actions cannot be justified merely on facts. The 
obedience to a system of  norms needs further justifica-
tion, that is, it needs elements of  substantive normativi-
ty, which means an underlying moral reason that justifies 
acting according to those legal documents43. For these 
authors, to justify something is to provide sound moral 
reasons in its favor; it is to argue why we ought to do 
something44.  Such moral standards are the source of  
judges’ moral legitimacy. There are two sorts of  moral 
basis that justify the courts’ existence: the rights-based 
approach and the procedural legitimacy approach45.
According to the rights-based approach, the main 
duty of  judges is to enforce the rights of  the individuals. 
This normative goal is what justifies any government ac-
tion, and it is also what sets its limits.  Hence, we can 
speak of  the two dimensions of  rights: they provide le-
gal standards to assess governmental actions, and they 
justify the exercise of  the authority vested in the judi-
ciary.  If  judges have the power to overturn laws enac-
ted by institutions with democratic legitimacy (like the 
parliament), it is because of  the justificatory dimension 
implied in the protection of  rights46.  The telos of  the 
judiciary is to make sure that government action does 
not violate such rights.  Proponents of  this theory place 
a strong emphasis on the notion of  rights because they 
conceive of  them as expressions of  basic moral princi-
ples, whose protection and expansion serve to advan-
ce the autonomy of  human beings, which is our most 
43 CARACCIOLO, R. Democracia y Obediencia al Derecho: El 
Argumento de Nino. Análisis Filosófico, v. 35, n. 1, p. 81–110, 2015.
44 NINO, C. El concepto de poder constituyente originario y la 
justificación jurídica. In: BULLYGIN, E. (ed.). El lenguaje del Derecho: 
Homenaje a Genaro Carrió. Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot, 1983. 
p. 339–370.
45 POOLE, T. Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review. Oxford Jour-
nal of  Legal Studies, v. 25, n. 4, p. 697–725, 2005.
46 POOLE, T. Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review. Oxford Jour-
nal of  Legal Studies, v. 25, n. 4, p. 697–725, 2005.
fundamental value47.  There are some discussions with 
regard to the nature of  the aforementioned moral prin-
ciples. A legal positivist may argue that their selection is 
a political matter48. The drafters of  a Constitution select 
a particular moral principle for its importance on society 
(say, free speech, for example).  Once enacted by law, it 
is the judges’ obligation to enforce them.  Others, like 
Finnis49, may argue that rights are necessary normative 
premises that are deducted from a fundamental unde-
rived moral principle (the achievement of  the common 
good). Whatever their origin, the relevant point for this 
branch is that rights constitute the foundation of  the au-
thority of  judges.  If  judges have a legitimate authority, 
it is because they are supposed to enforce the rights of  
the people.  That normative goal is so important as to 
justify the existence of  a non-democratic institution that 
has the power to oversee the other branches of  the State. 
The second approach is procedural, rather than 
substantive. It considers that the role of  the judiciary 
that legitimizes its authority is to oversee the exercise of  
public powers.  This more procedural approach focuses 
on matters related to authority, power, and competen-
ces for which issues related to the form of  the decisions 
are as important as issues related to its substance50. 
A common element underlying these two theories 
is that they both give legitimacy to a normative foun-
dation. A court’s decision is justified when it abides by 
its primary moral duty to obey the law; not any law, but 
a law that has been issued according to certain objecti-
ve moral standards (e.g., human rights, substantive and 
formal democracy)51. So, moral justifiability is the most 
fundamental form of  legitimacy that actually supports 
legal legitimacy at the abstract level52.  However, they are 
both intrinsically connected since ordering human re-
lations requires more than abstract fundamental moral 
principles.  The subjects of  law require certain formal 
principles, like certainty, transparency and predictability 
to get the best out of  the interactions with one ano-
47 PRIETO SANCHÍS, L. El Constitucionalismo de los Derechos. Ma-
drid: Trotta, 2013.
48 RAZ, J. Morality of  Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986.
49 FINNIS, J. Natural Law and Natural Rights. 2nd ed. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2011.
50 POOLE, T. Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review. Oxford Jour-
nal of  Legal Studies, v. 25, n. 4, p. 697–725, 2005.
51 NINO, C. La justificación de la democracia: entre la negación de 
la justificación y la restricción de la democracia. réplica a mis críticos. 
Análisis Filosófico, v. 2, p. 103–114, 1986.
52 NINO, C. Ética y Derechos Humanos. Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1984.
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ther; and they get that from a structured legal system 
of  rules and principles.  Hence, the moral obligation of  
the judges can be construed as the imperative to abide 
by a legal system whose existence and enforcement is 
further justified by the substantial values of  democracy 
and human rights.
3.3 The sociological approach 
In the realm of  political sciences, the concept of  
legitimacy acquires a descriptive sense. Descriptive ap-
proaches to legitimacy try to explain what makes the 
activity of  courts sustainable over time.  This is what 
Fallon calls the sociological legitimacy of  the courts53. 
Sociological legitimacy is an empirically-rooted (contin-
gent) concept that refers to the approval of  a number 
of  relevant actors in the judicial lawmaking process. 
That approval depends on how those constituencies 
perceive the activity of  the institution; and it is that ap-
proval what sustains, politically, the institution over time. 
Some authors in political science define legitimacy as a 
collective belief  in the adequacy of  the existing political 
institutions.  Lipset defines it as: “the capacity of  a po-
litical system to engender and maintain the belief  that 
existing political institutions are the most appropriate 
and proper ones for the society”54. 
As Grossman states, the sociological legitimacy is 
“agent-related,” which means that it is created by the 
different stakeholders55.  In the case of  international ad-
judicative bodies, the member states, of  course, play a 
crucial role, but they are not the only actors.  National 
political parties, nongovernmental organizations, eli-
tes, and even voters help to shape the capricious political 
support towards an international court which has come 
to be known as sociological legitimacy.  The conflic-
ting interests of  many stakeholders shape each State’s 
preferences, and, in turn, it is each State’s preferences 
what affects the stability of  the transnational adjudica-
tive system directly. This is the sense employed by Do-
than56, for whom international courts’ legitimacy is the 
community perception that they are just, correct, and 
53 FALLON, R. Legitimacy and the Constitution. Harvard Law Re-
view, v. 118, p. 1787, 2005.
54 LIPSET, S. M. Political Man: The Social Bases of  Politics. 2nd ed. 
London: Heinemann, 1983. p. 64.
55 GROSSMAN, N. Legitimacy and International Adjudicative 
Bodies. George Washing International Law Review, v. 41, p. 107, 2009.
56 DOTHAN, S. How International Courts Enhance Their Legiti-
macy. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, v. 14, p. 455-478, 2013.
unbiased so that their judgments will be accepted even 
though some actors might disagree with them.
It is important to notice that there is no necessa-
ry connection between the normative and sociological 
legitimacy.  It is true that, in principle, if  people (as a 
collective) accept law as a legitimate enterprise, it is 
because they believe that judges decide cases (in an un-
biased and impartial manner) according to objective 
parameters of  procedural and material justice (these 
parameters are usually expressed in written documents 
that constitute the legal framework to be enforced by 
courts)57.  However, the fact that people believe that an 
institution is legitimate (sociological), does not make it 
legitimate (normative).  And the other way around: an 
institution can be legitimate (in the normative sense) 
even when people believe that it is not (it lacks socio-
logical legitimacy).  So, the fact that a court generally 
acts in a legitimate legal way (assuming the thesis of  the 
unique right legal answer) will not necessarily make it be 
perceived as legitimate in the sociological sense by all 
the constituencies.
3.4 The dilemma of international courts 
Now, this work focuses on the normative legitima-
cy of  international courts, which is different from the 
normative legitimacy of  domestic courts. For one thing, 
for domestic courts, the sociological legitimacy is not 
as critical as it is for international courts.  Of  course, 
domestic courts are constrained by the power held by 
national elites and local political groups, but (at least in 
consolidated democracies) they do not have the power 
to do away with the institution of  the judiciary, nor does 
any of  the branches of  the State. The situation with in-
ternational courts is different. They must accommodate 
the interests (legitimate or not) of  all the stakeholders in 
order to survive.  If  they do not, the whole transnatio-
nal system of  law could be dismantled.  Furthermore, 
national courts have as their immediate public a coun-
try, a nation, whose people tend to share core values; in-
ternational courts dialogue with varied countries, whose 
people often have different values. This means that nor-
mative legitimacy is also trickier for international courts. 
In addition, Grossman58 also points out that the legal 
57 GROSSMAN, N. Legitimacy and International Adjudicative 
Bodies. George Washing International Law Review, v. 41, p. 107, 2009.
58 GROSSMAN, N. The Normative Legitimacy of  International 
Courts. Temple Law Review, v. 86, p. 61, 2013.
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document that gives them their authority arises from 
the consent of  the contracting member states, but their 
decisions have deep impact on natural and legal persons 
that did not enter into the agreement (such as non-con-
tracting states, non-governmental organizations, busi-
nesses located outside the region).  Furthermore, the 
rulings affect directly people who did not get the chance 
to take part in the process59.  A ruling from the EC-
tHR against Italy, for example, may affect citizens from 
France or Germany.  So, the consent of  the contracting 
member States is neither a sound legal nor moral reason 
to justify the authority that, in practice, they bear.
The three types of  legitimacy clash when it comes 
to international courts. Their dilemma can be stated as 
follows: If  they are to maintain the stability of  the sys-
tem and be effective, they must, sometimes, disregard 
the single right legal answer and be indulgent to the in-
terests of  the most powerful nations of  the transnatio-
nal system.  Acting like this may preserve the stability of  
the system from the political perspective but at the cost 
of  undermining its normative foundations, i.e., the moral 
reasons that support the obedience to their rulings.  The 
normative foundations of  an international court rely on 
the consent of  the Member States.  The court exists 
because a group of  States agreed to create a transnatio-
nal court to which they would surrender (part of) their 
sovereignty, presupposing that the court would use its 
power to enforce the terms of  a specific treaty, not the 
interests of  the powerful nations.  So, if  the courts are 
not faithful to the consent of  the States expressed in 
the text of  the treaty, their authority would not be jus-
tified; that is, the institution as such would lose its legal 
legitimacy. Given this complicated situation, internatio-
nal courts must adopt strategies that are seemingly at 
odds with the law in order to enhance their sociological 
legitimacy and be effective; in doing so, they lose their 
normative legitimacy. So, normative legitimacy seems to 
be something that international courts, by their very na-
ture, cannot afford.  All that international courts seem 
to have is sociological legitimacy. But, if  their mission is 
not to secure the rights of  the individuals, what is their 
function and what justifies their existence and activity? 
Do they have any normative legitimacy whatsoever? An 
even more fundamental question would be, can an in-
ternational court of  law exist without normative legiti-
macy that justifies its authority?  
59 GROSSMAN, N. The Normative Legitimacy of  International 
Courts. Temple Law Review, v. 86, p. 61, 2013.
We believe that, theoretically, an international court 
of  law without normative foundations is not coherent 
for it would entail either to deny the legal character of  
the international court or to deny the normative nature 
of  law. The problem lies in the way in which legal and 
political scholars have framed the issue.  We believe that 
it is possible to build a theory of  the normative legiti-
macy of  international courts that reconciles both the 
legal character of  the international court, the norma-
tive nature of  law, and strategic behavior. This is not 
a mere thought experiment.  Reframing the theory of  
the normative legitimacy of  international courts have 
practical implications.  Indeed, we need an appropriate 
theoretical framework to assess the activity of  an inter-
national court to determine if  it is achieving its norma-
tive goals and to design the necessary reforms to the 
specific transnational system of  law. That is what we 
will proceed to do in the next section.
4  A new theory of the normative 
legitimacy of international courts 
To redefine the theory of  normative legitimacy of  
international courts, we must find what truly makes 
their authority justified, independently of  the percep-
tions of  the different stakeholders.  We argue that this 
‘something’ is its crucial function in creating, maintai-
ning and advancing a “constitutional state of  affairs.” 
In this section, we will sketch the foundations of  a new 
theory of  the normative legitimacy of  international ad-
judicative bodies.
Our theory of  the normative legitimacy of  interna-
tional courts also relies on the justificatory power of  
rights. However, we take on a new approach that de-
parts from the traditional understanding of  rights as 
devices of  protection for the subjects of  law.  Under 
the traditional understanding, rights are seen as subjective 
rights (subjective in the sense that they protect a spe-
cific subject, be it a person or a determined group of  
persons) that were devised by the constituent power to 
protect the citizens from the power of  the State; and, 
later in history, to give the citizens certain privileges and 
claims against the State. This position was summarized 
by the German Federal Constitutional Court, in its de-
cision BVerfGE 7, 198 (Lüth case): “There is no doubt 
that the main purpose of  basic rights is to protect the 
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individual’s sphere of  freedom against encroachment by 
public power: they are the citizen’s bulwark against the 
state”. The most relevant feature of  this subjective dimen-
sion of  rights is that they follow the structure subject 
– right – claim: 
Subject A has the right to R, which can be enforced 
against subject B;
Subject B violated the right R;
Subject A has a claim against subject B.
In the context of  constitutional and international 
law, the subjects will usually be a citizen or a member 
State.  So, a citizen may have a claim against a member 
State (not the other way around); and a member State 
may have a claim against another member State, but a 
citizen does not have a claim against another citizen. 
Using Hohfeld’s60 classification, the right may involve 
a claim (that involves a duty to do or not to do some-
thing enforceable against the other party), a privilege 
(meaning that party A does not have a right to demand 
party B to abstain from performing certain activity), an 
immunity (meaning that party A cannot be affected by 
certain legal power vested – by the law or a contract – 
on party B) or a power (meaning that party A has a cer-
tain ability to change the legal status of  party B without 
his acquiescence)61.  Under this conception, the courts’ 
normative legitimacy stems from their function to hear 
the claims of  the plaintiffs and enforce only the valid 
ones, which is a way to materialize justice. This approa-
ch is inapplicable in the context of  international courts. 
For the reasons stated above, they simply cannot afford 
to act as a court of  a fourth instance to decide indivi-
dual claims, understood in Hohfeldian way. Therefore, 
a different approach is needed as the foundation of  the 
normative legitimacy of  international courts.  
A better-suited conception for international settings 
entails that rights are commands to achieve an objective value-
-laden “state of  affairs” directed towards the authorities, 
not legal devices that guarantee the efficacy of  what the 
law promises to the subjects. This approach relies on 
the theory of  the double dimension of  fundamental ri-
ghts which was initiated originally by the Federal Cons-
titutional Tribunal of  Germany in the aforementioned 
Lüth case: 
60 HOHFELD, W. Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Ap-
plied to Legal Reasoning. Yale Law Journal, v. 23, n. 1, p. 16-59, 1913.
61 HOHFELD, W. Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Ap-
plied to Legal Reasoning. Yale Law Journal, v. 23, n. 1, p. 16-59, 1913.
But far from being a value-free system the Constitu-
tion erects an objective system of  values in its section on 
basic rights, and thus expresses and reinforces the 
validity of  the basic rights. This system of  values, 
centering on the freedom of  the human being to 
develop in society, must apply as a constitutional 
axiom throughout the whole legal system: it must 
direct and inform legislation, administration, and 
judicial decision.
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1958)
This ruling (later followed by decisions No. 53/1985 
and 69/1995) galvanized a whole new line of  reasoning 
that was later developed by legal scholars like Zagrebelsky 
and Robert Alexy.  The basic insight into the new approa-
ch is that rights are not only devices of  legal protection 
of  individuals against unjustified state interventions, but 
an objective system of  values that constitute the very founda-
tions of  all the State activity.  As such, they ought to ins-
pire the production, interpretation and the enforcement 
of  the law, plus they ought to orient public policy62.
From this line of  reasoning, Robert Alexy deve-
loped a new theory of  rights as legal principles.  He 
conceptualized principles as: “Norms commanding that 
something be realized to the highest degree that is actually and 
legally possible”63. He further states that: “Principles are 
therefore optimization commands. They can be fulfilled in 
different degrees. The mandatory degree of  fulfillment 
depends not only on facts, but also on legal possibilities. 
The field of  legal possibilities is determined by counter-
vailing principles and rules”64. What Alexy argues con-
vincingly is that legal principles constitute provisions of  
legal nature (not merely political declarations of  goo-
dwill) from where concrete duties are generated.  What 
a legal principle establishes with a sufficient degree of  
determinacy is “an ideal ‘ought’ that is not yet relativized 
to the actual and legal possibilities”65. 
Following Alexy, what principles offer is a normative 
orientation with regard to a broad set of  circumstances 
(like the ones that make up for the right to freedom of  
expression or the right to privacy). The concrete duties 
depend on the conditions that limit the ability of  the 
State to advance the ideal declared by the legal prin-
62 ZAGREBELSKY, G. El Derecho Dúctil. 2nd ed. Madrid: Trotta, 
2011.
63 ALEXY, R. On the Structure of  Legal Principles. Ratio Juris, v. 
13, n. 3, p. 295, 2000.
64 ALEXY, R. On the Structure of  Legal Principles. Ratio Juris, v. 
13, n. 3, p. 295, 2000.
65 ALEXY, R. On the Structure of  Legal Principles. Ratio Juris, v. 
13, n. 3, p. 300, 2000.
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ciple. In other words, the extent to which a principle 
should be developed in reality is a function of  the cons-
traints faced by the branches of  the State (adjudicators, 
legislature, the executive branch, and agencies). So, the 
key takeaway in Alexy’s theory is that adjudicators are 
obliged to advance rights to the largest extent possible. If  
this holds, and we acknowledge that the need for poli-
tical support is a substantial constraint of  international 
courts, then the need for political support constitutes a 
significant limitation to their ability to advance the nor-
mative content of  the rights. Indeed, not considering 
the different interests of  the stakeholders of  internatio-
nal politics and failing to “disregard” positive law when 
it is necessary to maintain the cohesion of  the transna-
tional legal system will bring about a state of  affairs that 
is contrary to the obligation to optimize the content of  
the rights “to the greatest extent possible”66.
What we argue here is not that international adju-
dicators must always satisfy the interests of  the most 
powerful nations, for that would also delegitimize 
the transnational system and bring about its eventual 
collapse. Rather, we posit that judges – to avoid the advent 
of  a reality that is contrary to rights in their objective dimen-
sion – must consider in their balancing exercise for each 
case exogenous factors (omnipresent political forces) 
that might affect the effectiveness of  the decision and 
the sociological legitimacy of  the court in the short and 
long term. Taking into consideration the exogenous po-
litical factors in their decisions is not only legitimate, but 
also necessary to consolidate the effectiveness of  the 
system. This way, international courts can materialize 
the state of  affairs envisaged by the law (and which they 
are required to enforce).
In the context of  the aforementioned balancing 
exercise, we must bear in mind that what we balance are 
legal principles. We find two relevant types of  legal prin-
ciples, namely, substantive and institutional principles. 
Substantive principles refer to what the different subjects 
of  law (e.g. natural and legal persons, groups of  people, 
States) owe to one another as a matter of  fairness, while 
institutional principles are the ones that the law gives 
to itself, to secure the effective functioning of  the sys-
tem (e.g., the principle of  res judicata, non-retroactivity 
of  the law and the internal hierarchy of  the different 
66 ALEXY, R. On the Structure of  Legal Principles. Ratio Juris, v. 
13, n. 3, p. 300, 2000.
laws). Atienza and Ruiz Manero67 argue that institutio-
nal principles are naturally heavier than any substantive 
principles. Hence, they are virtually impossible to be 
defeated when they are involved in any given balancing 
exercise. In practice, this means that, in strict rationality, 
we should almost never break the non-retroactivity of  
the law to favor a substantive principle, like the right to 
life68 – save extraordinary circumstances, like the crimes 
committed by the Nazi regime during World War II. We 
posit that sociological legitimacy (which is the basis of  
the effectiveness of  any given legal system) is one of  
such institutional principles. This makes perfect sense, 
after all, if  we allow the institutional principles to be 
defeated with relatively high frequency, the sociological 
foundations of  law would be severely undermined and 
the stability of  the whole system would be compromi-
sed69.  This means that the material (factual) political 
constraints faced by international adjudicators translate 
into legal and moral reasons that authorize to sacrifice 
the fairness of  the decision of  a given individual case 
for the sake of  the attainment of  a greater extent of  
materialization of  rights in their objective dimension.
Now, this idea should not come as a surprise for 
there are well-established instances of  such reasoning 
throughout the different global adjudicative systems. 
The Colombian Constitutional Court pioneered the 
thesis of  the “unconstitutional State of  affairs” who-
se theoretical foundations relied on the objective di-
mensions of  rights. According to this thesis, rights are 
conceived of  not so much as individual claims, but as 
guiding principles that determine (in a binding way) 
what realities should be constructed by means of  State 
action.  In this line of  reasoning, the Colombian Consti-
tutional Court has declared that it has the duty to inter-
vene not only to restore justice in individual claims, but 
also to restore the constitutionality of  reality.  A reality 
is unconstitutional when a group of  people is forced 
by circumstances to be harmed in ways that substan-
tially deviate from the state of  affairs envisaged by the 
constituent power70.  Romero describes the doctrine of  
67 ATIENZA, M.; RUIZ MANERO, J. La dimensión institucional 
del Derecho y la justificación jurídica. Doxa, v. 24, p. 115–130, 2001.
68 ATIENZA, M.; RUIZ MANERO, J. La dimensión institucional 
del Derecho y la justificación jurídica. Doxa, v. 24, p. 115–130, 2001.
69 ATIENZA, M.; RUIZ MANERO, J. La dimensión institucional 
del Derecho y la justificación jurídica. Doxa, v. 24, p. 115–130, 2001. 
70 QUINTERO, J.; NAVARRO, A.; MESA, M. El Estado de Cosas 
Inconstitucionales como mecanismo de protección de los derechos 
fundamentales de la población vulnerable de Colombia. Revista Ju-
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the “unconstitutional state of  affairs” as: “A solution 
that the constitutional judge adopts when it verifies that 
the causes of  the generalized violation of  fundamental 
rights are structural, in light of  which, the court must 
issue commands towards the administrative authorities 
with the purpose of  remedying the unconstitutional 
situation”71. According to this doctrine, it is the duty 
of  the highest tribunals to tackle unconstitutional rea-
lities.  From this, we can infer the correlative duty of  
not to create an “unconstitutional state of  affairs.”  We 
can also relate this to international courts.  As we have 
said, in the context of  international adjudicative bodies, 
failing to preserve the sociological legitimacy of  the 
courts is a way to create an “unconstitutional state of  
affairs”, which is characterized as the absolute lack of  
a transnational system of  justice that is able to address 
acute social problems that threatens the materialization 
of  fundamental rights in reality.
In the context of  the European Court of  Human 
Rights (ECtHR), a similar doctrine was developed to 
transform the nature of  the court.  Originally, scholars 
thought of  the court as an adjudicative institution who-
se function was to bring justice to individuals who had 
suffered a violation of  their human rights in the hands 
of  the State members. Given the practical difficulties 
that the court faces when trying to deliver individual 
justice to millions of  citizens, the institution underwent 
substantial structural changes that transformed it into a 
transnational organization of  judicial nature whose func-
tion is to advance the prevalence of  human rights in the 
region, not to bring individual justice on a case-by-case 
basis72. The new approach to the role of  the ECtHR can 
be explained as the prevalence of  the general develop-
ment of  rights over the individual claims of  justice. This 
doctrine is rooted on the premise that whenever choices 
need to be made in the transnational context, the general 
interest must prevail over the particular ones (no matter 
how unfair the individual result turns out to be).
Bringing these discussions to the Hawk-Dove game 
that courts play, we can envisage compatibility between 
rídica Mario Alario D’Filippo, v. 3, n. 1, p. 69–80, 2011.
71 ROMERO, N. La doctrina del Estado de Cosas Inconstitucional 
en Colombia novedades del neoconstitucionalismo y “La inconstitu-
cionalidad de la realidad.” Derecho Público Iberoamericano, v. 1, p. 244, 
2012.
72 CHRISTOFFERSEN, J. Individual and Constitutional Justice: 
Can the Power Balance of  Adjudication be Reversed? In: INDI-
VIDUAL and Constitutional Justice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011.
strategic behavior and legitimacy. The strategy is only 
legally justified when it can be explicitly justified as part 
of  the objective system of  values and the necessity of  
maintaining a constitutional state of  affairs (or avoiding 
an unconstitutional state of  affairs, at least). In our pre-
vious example (section 2), the right answer for the in-
ternational court would be A, all things considered, but 
not because of  the strategy as such. Rather, A would be 
the right answer because the other options, including B, 
would bring about an unconstitutional state of  affairs 
(with the withdrawal of  the country from the system). 
Therefore, in international-national interactions, the ri-
ght answer must do away with individualist approaches 
to the notion of  ‘right’ to favor the sustainability of  an 
objective system of  values. In other words, what we ar-
gue is that behaving strategically can be legitimate for 
the international court as long as it is in compliance with 
its higher obligation to advance rights to the largest ex-
tent possible. As posited in section 3, a solid conception 
of  normative (legal + moral) legitimacy does not entail 
the blind application of  the law solely, but needs to be 
justified by moral standards. The moral standards that, 
according to our theory, justifies disregarding the legally 
correct (in the sense employed by Dworkin) claim of  
individual right, in the case of  international courts, are 
rights in their objective dimension, which compel the 
international courts to act strategically in order to create 
and maintain constitutional state of  affairs. To achieve 
normative legitimacy, the judge must counterweigh that 
right legal answer with higher moral standards that are 
not expressed in the text of  the treaty, namely, rights in 
their objective dimension (from which the theory of  the 
constitutional state of  affairs is derived). 
Despite our use of  the Dworkinian expression ‘right 
answer’ above, these conclusions also affect positivism. 
Acknowledging the legal dimension of  the strategy also 
means that there cannot be two equally valid answers 
within the law. In positivism, the strategy would be extra-
-legal, and the law would provide two answers. But this is 
because positivism is rooted in an individualist concep-
tion of  rights. When we consider the collective aspect of  
human interaction and the objective dimension of  law, a 
strategy can be something legal. As a consequence, there 
are not any more valid answers, but only one. Therefore, 
what would be deemed as political (due to positivism 
individualistic traits) is actually legal in nature because 
it is part of  the constitutional state of  affairs and the 
objective system of  values that ought to be sustained.  
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A final consideration must be highlighted about our 
understanding of  the legitimate use of  strategy by in-
ternational courts: the consideration and weight given 
to the constitutional state of  affairs must be explicit. 
Following Fuller’s73 account of  transparency as one of  
the constituents of  the internal morality of  law, any stra-
tegy would only be admissible if  the international court 
explicitly includes the exogenous variables (political, 
economic, cultural or otherwise) as part of  the balan-
cing exercise that constitutes the body of  the ruling. As 
our understanding of  legitimacy encompasses normati-
ve grounds, publicity of  all the elements at play is an in-
dispensable aspect for admitting strategic behavior into 
the legal realm. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper started from a puzzle that stemmed from 
game theory in face of  traditional jurisprudence. As de-
veloped in section 2, game theory suggests that courts 
disregard the law in favor of  political aspects, acting 
strategically. However, this is not the role assigned to 
courts in any system. Thus, why could it be legitimate 
for international courts to disregard the right answer in 
a case to give way to strategic political calculations that 
tend to maintain the stability of  the system, but seemin-
gly do not relate to the case at hand? After reviewing 
three approaches to legitimacy, we highlighted why 
none of  the three alone was suited for understanding 
the situation of  international courts (section 3). The-
refore, the legitimacy of  international courts must be 
understood as a combination of  the three, which is only 
possible when we wield a non-individualist conception 
of  rights, rather one that encompasses an objective sys-
tem of  values in order to achieve a constitutional state 
of  affairs (section 4). 
Based on this objective system of  values understan-
ding, we find that it is legitimate, in the sense herein des-
cribed, for international adjudicative bodies to follow 
the strategic patterns of  behavior derived from game 
theory. That is, it is legitimate to enact judicial dialogues 
as a Hawk-Dove game: being assertive or refraining 
from it to avoid the escalation of  tensions to the point 
where the conflict is insurmountable. It follows that in-
73 FULLER, L. L. The Morality of  Law. New Haven; London: Yale 
University Press, 1969.
ternational adjudicative bodies ought to act in a strategi-
cally (not entirely principled) to keep the dialogue going 
on.  The last assertion, which, at first glance, looks like 
a utilitarian maneuver, translates into a legal obligation 
that the courts are obliged to follow: the obligation to 
preserve the system, as a matter of  binding law.
We contend so for two reasons. First, because insti-
tutional principles (of  which effectiveness is a power-
ful one) generally trump substantial principles; and that 
could be the situation of  the case at hand, if  and only 
if  the balancing exercise, which courts must explicitly 
perform in a case-to-case basis, shows that it is necessa-
ry to disregard the correct individual claim of  rights for 
the sake of  maintaining the effectiveness of  the trans-
national system of  law. The second reason is that the 
courts’ moral obligation to maximize the constitutional 
state of  affairs requires international courts to privilege 
the maintenance of  the system over specific individual 
claims. When rights are understood as part of  an ob-
jective system of  values that serves as a set of  guiding 
principles for authorities, overriding what could be thought of  
as the right answer considering the individual is exposed as a 
form of  normative legitimacy. 
For future studies, it can be tested whether interna-
tional courts follow the theoretical framework proposed 
here. That is, if  they privilege institutional principles, ai-
ming at improving or maintaining a constitutional state 
of  affairs while making explicit all the variables in the 
balancing exercise. With this assessment, game theory 
will be able to include a normative perspective in its dis-
cussions. 
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